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EXPROPRIATION
Melvin G. Dakin*
Litigation in the field of expropriation law has increased
substantially during recent terms of court, attributable in substantial part to the taking of land necessary to highway programs. However, other condemnation proceedings have not
lagged, with the increased needs for installations by municipalities, port authorities, river authorities, and the continuing
needs of levee districts.
The extent to which lands adjacent to lakes and rivers, but
not fronting thereon, owe a public servitude, and can hence be
appropriated without compensation, was before the Supreme
Court in Jeanerette Lumber & Shingle Co.' The Third Circuit
had refused relief to a landowner on the ground that Civil Code
article 665 permitted such appropriation of all lands "within the
range of the reasonable necessity of the situation as produced
by the forces of nature unaided by artificial causes." The Supreme Court held that only lands which were riparian when separated from the state were burdened with such a servitude; if
title cannot be traced to a riparian tract to which the servitude
attached, damages are recoverable in accordance with the ex2
propriation laws of the state.
In Bowie Lumber Co.,3 on the other hand, there was found
no inherent power in a pipeline company to condemn property;
however, a certification of convenience and necessity from the
Federal Power Commission authorizing the construction of the
pipeline between two towns was deemed sufficient delegated authority to expropriate necessary property. 4 As to location of
servitude, the First Circuit adopted encyclopedic jurisprudence
to the effect that the grantee of eminent domain power has the
right to determine and such determination will not be interfered
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Jeanerette Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Board of Com'rs, 249 La. 508, 187
So. 2d 715 (1966), amending and affirming 181 So. 2d 415 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1965), noted 27 LA. L. REV. 321 (1967).
2. 187 So. 2d at 719-20. While policy is not discussed by the court, the holding is one clearly in favor of spreading the levee burdens, subject, however, to
the rather erratic effect of the size and location of original grants from the
public domain.
3. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Bowie Lumber Co., 176 So. 2d 735
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
4. Id. at 738.
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with if made in good faith and not capricious or wantonly injurious; merely proving that another route is feasible is not sufficient to establish lack of good faith or abuse of power.5
The Third Circuit Court had a somewhat novel problem posed
for them by the "taking" involved in lands to be flooded through
the construction of the Toledo Bend Dam and Reservoir." Lands
in question were found to have a present value for leasing because of exploration for oil and gas in the area. While the Authority argued any such value was too speculative to permit the
award of damages, the Third Circuit nonetheless decided that
evidence supported severance damages to retained mineral rights
in the amount of $11.00 per acre. 7 This was found to be current
lease value potential according to the evidence, and such lease
value would be entirely lost by deep water coverage and limitations on drilling for oil and gas imposed by the Authority on
mineral rights reservations. The possibility of directional drilling in this area was not discussed.
The great importance of determinations of "highest and best
use" of property expropriated was well illustrated, again in the
Third Circuit, in a taking for transmission-line right-of-way. 8
The land in question bordered a river, but being unused timberland was valued by the taker at only $200.00 per acre. Landowner, however, adduced evidence to show that some of the land
had a present market for industrial purposes but the comparable
sales adduced as evidence of such industrial value were sales,
mainly, to pipelines. The trial judge excluded such comparables
on the assumption that, being made under threat of expropriation, they were not voluntary sales and hence not usable as evidence. The Third Circuit disagreed, noting that, while not necessarily controlling, such sales are nevertheless to be considered
as evidence of value in the absence of other sales and, in any
event, are superior to merely theoretical calculations as to the
worth of average timberland. Consideration being given to such
5. 2 9a C.J.S. Eminent Domain 376, § 91.
6. Sabine River Authority v. Salter, 184 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
7. Id. at 788. In Sabine River Authority v. Jordan Miller, 184 So. 2d 780
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1966) and Sabine River Authority v. Ross Miller, 189 So. 2d
603 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966), the court found severance damages to be $15 per
acre. Writ granted on another point, 190 So. 2d 914 (La. 1966).
8. Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Norman, 183 So. 2d 421 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1966), writ refused 249 La. 118, 185 So. 2d 529 (1966).
9. 183 So. 2d at 427.
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sales, an average value of $500.00 per acre was fixed by the
court.',
The condemnor fought another losing battle on the river
front in the Burden case," the property in this case being destined for highway right-of-way. Condemnor took some 14 acres
from a 1016-acre tract, depositing an award of approximately
$550.00 per acre, without severance damages. The evidence demonstrated to the trial court a value of $1000.00 per acre on the
basis of testimony that the tract could be sold for industrial use
if put on the market. Condemnor's argument that the record
was barren of evidence of interest in the tract for industrial
purposes was presumably deemed countered by the testimony of
a realtor that the property "will be sold if it's offered on the market within a reasonable length of time and it will be a reasonable purchase at $1000.00 per acre.' '1 2 Despite the fact that the
tract was already bisected by pipeline, powerline, and railroad
right-of-way, further bisection by a highway was believed to
sever the tract for industrial purposes and reduce the value of
the remainder away from the river from $1000.00 to $550.00
per acre while enhancing the value of the river front remainder
to $1750.00 per acre. Condemnor argued in brief that the damages testified to for the owner were "wholly illusory, problematical, and too speculative." The trial judge noted, in awarding
severance damages, that he had "no way of determining severance damages except to follow the testimony of an expert." 13
Condemnor and court agreed that "the correct law" directed that
"market value must be determined according to the highest and
best use thereof, provided that a market or demand therefor be
14
shown with reasonable certainty in not too distant future."'
In still another taking of river property, damages were said
by condemnor to be conjectural and merely consequential, arising
from discomfort, disturbance, and injury to business and hence
not to qualify as severance damages. 15 Nonetheless, owner was
able to prove that installation of a railroad spur, essential to
the potential industrial use of the property would cost $38,400
10.
11.
12.
13.
1966),
14.

Id. at 431.
State v. Burden, 180 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
Id. at 789.
Id. at 791. See also State v. Neyrey, 186 So. 2d 705 (La. App. 4th Cir.
writ
refused 249 La. 706, 190 So. 2d 230 (1966).
180 So.
2d at 785, citing State v. Hedwig, 133 So. 2d 180 (La.
App. 4th
Cir. 1961).
15. State v. Phillips, 180 So. 2d 879, 881 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
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more than prior to a highway right-of-way taking. This was
accepted as substantially measuring the severance damage in
the absence of any contrary evidence by condemnor. 1 6 The cost
of relocating buildings to provide parking space taken for right17
of-way has also been held to measure severance damages.
An estimate based on practical knowledge and experience in
real estate and farm operations was accepted as sustaining, in
the absence of comparable sales data, severance damages of 25
per cent in value of farm land due to a highway bisecting tract
of riceland and rendering bisected tracts uneconomic for separate irrigation.' On the other hand, the First Circuit peremptorily rejected a percentage decrease approach to severance
damages based, not on expert opinion, but on trial judge's use
of percentage figures culled from a supposedly similar case. 19
The "burden of establishing severance damages," the First Circuit said, "rests upon the owner." 2 The court quoted further
from an encyclopedic treatise to the effect that "severance damages cannot be presumed and unless the owner of the remaining
property shows by competent evidence that the value of his remaining land has been diminished by the taking, compensation
2
will be limited to the value of the land actually taken." '
In the Singletary case, 22 the land actually expropriated from
"prestige" residential property was valued at the nominal sum
of $1025.00. However, it was taken in order to construct an
expressway ramp which exposed the owner to a substantial flow
of traffic immediately adjacent to the residence. The owner's
appraiser estimated that the value of the property had decreased
$38,000.00 due to the expressway installation, including in his
estimate of decrease, the loss of view resulting from the expressway bridge across the lake. The court said, "Loss of view per se
is not compensable as a separate item of damage, but nevertheless is an element of damage and may be considered by the
appraisers in estimating or determining the commercial value
16. Ibid. In Cleco v. Williams, 181 So. 2d 844 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965), the
cost of modifying radio equipment on mobile farms units made necessary by installation of powerline was deemed to measure part of severance damages.
17. Dow v. State, 179 So. 2d 666 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965). See also State v.
Adams, 184 So. 2d 744 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
18. State v. Gielen, 184 So. 2d 737 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
19. Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Hatcher, 184 So. 2d 326 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1966).
20. Id. at 331.
21. Ibid. See also Cleco v. Dunbar, 183 So. 2d 111, 117 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1965); State v. Tessitore, 178 So. 2d 501, 508 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
22. State v. Singletary, 185 So. 2d 642 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
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of the property remaining after expropriation."
It would seem
generally immaterial to the owner whether or not it is a separate item of damages if he has other severance damage with
which it can be combined as an element and counted in the
24
total.
In 1964, in the Kendall case, 25 a suit for consequential damages based on the constitutional provision that "property shall
not be taken or damaged" without compensation, a claim for
"loss of use and enjoyment" of a lake was unsuccessfully made.
The court recognized that a physical invasion of real property
was not indispensable to a claim for damages and proceeded to
award damages for sand and dirt which had washed into an
artificial lake from a nearby highway right-of-way, filling it
with silt, rendering it unusable for fish cultivation, and necessitating its drainage. Absent comparable before and after values
from which to measure the damage, the trial court accepted, as
evidence of damage, the cost of repairing the damage. But the
Second Circuit excluded $1000.00 awarded by the trial court for
"loss of the use and enjoyment of the lake," since such loss of
26
use would have no effect on market value.
Where severance damages, computed on the basis of a percentage decrease in the market value before the partial taking,
were complained of as inadequately compensating for esthetic
losses, the Third Circuit noted that "under the prevalent jurisprudence the owner is not entitled to compensation for noneconomic consequential injuries such as discomfort, disturbance,
or loss of value in expropriation proceedings . . . unless such
23. Id. at 647-48. The encyclopedic treatise relied upon, while noting recovery
for interference with easements of view, also notes that "in order to recover for
interference with . . . view because of the relocation of a street or highway, the
owner must have a right in the nature of an easement in that particular street
or highway." 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain 432, § 105(2). See, however, Patin v.
City of New Orleans, 233 La. 703, 66 So. 2d 616 (1953) ; Harrison v. Louisiana
Highway Comm'n, 202 La. 345, 11 So. 2d 612 (1942) ; Carter v. Louisiana Highway Comm'n, 6 So. 2d 159 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942) recognizing impairment of
view as an element of damage without this limitation.
24. The cited treatise actually goes only so far as to state that "easements
of light, air, view, and access have only a nominal value apart from the abutting
property, the real injury suffered by the owner lying in the effect produced on
his abutting lands by the wrongful interference with the easements, and their
value is measured not by the value of the easements, separately, but by the damage
which the property sustains in consequence of their loss, and the effect of such
loss on the market value." 29A C.J.S. 718, § 167.
25. Kendall v. State, 168 So. 2d 840 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
26. Id. at 845. However, the inability to "use and enjoy the lake" would be
clearly lost during the period of repair and would thus in a very real sense be
damages.
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consequential damages diminish the market value of the property."

27

In a pipeline right-of-way condemnation, 28 severance damage
was sought to be minimized by the condemnor on the ground
that the right-of-way land was still largely available for use by
lot owners; but evidence of presence of pipeline as depreciating
factor in other subdivisions supported landowner. Condemnor
sought also to minimize severance damages to potential rural
homesites by decreasing assumed lot size, but was held bound by
an earlier Supreme Court finding of specific lot size to be the
highest and best use of the land, which finding had become, on
29
remand, the "law of the case."
The Third Circuit also had occasion, in Comeaux,30 to note
that "physical invasion of real property ... is not indispensable
to the infliction of damages, within the meaning of . . . the

Louisiana Constitution." However, a claim for consequential
damages to a tract of land separate from the tract partially
taken was rejected where the owner could not show that the
damages were special to him and not sustained by the neighborhood generally.8 ' On the other hand, the same court stated in
Miller3 2 that benefits may be offset against damages where an
actual increase in value is shown (although it found no such
increase present there) even though several owners are so
favored by the improvement; the benefit is nonetheless "special"
to each of the favored owners rather than "general" to the community as a whole. 83
A rather disingenuous use of the term "general benefits"
was attempted in Anding,3 4 where a partial taking occurred
which rendered a portion of the remainder valueless because
without access. However, the highway contractor used dirt from
this tract, paying the owner at the rate of $1000.00 per acre, a
transaction which occurred after the suit to expropriate was
27. State v. Babineaux, 189 So. 2d 450, 453 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
28. Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Broussard, 177 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1965).
29. Id. at 146.
30. Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Comeaux, 182 So. 2d 187 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1966).
31. Id. at 189.
32. State v. Miller, 182 So. 2d 155 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
33. Id. at 157, citing City of Natchitoches v. Cox, 135 So. 2d 302 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1961).
34. State v. Anding, 189 So.2d 445 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
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filed. The owner argued against offsetting such sums against
severance damage on the theory this was a general benefit since
the dirt could have been purchased from any of several affected
owners! The court rejected any solution in the context of "benefits" and instead applied La. R.S. 48:453 directing that severance damages be determined as of the time of trial; on this
basis, the court reasoned that the remainder which had been
valued at $4250.00, with severance damages at $2550.00 at the
time of taking, had since brought in excess of such value and
such excess must be credited against the award.3 5 The provision
for valuation at the time of trial was designed to mitigate severance damages (or increase them) on the basis of events occurring
after the taking and up to the time of trial, which trial could
take place more than a year after the project was completed. 6
Such were the events here which turned potential severance damages of $2550.00 from the highway construction into an oppor37
tunity to sell dirt from the land for twice its original value.
The First Circuit had occasion to incorporate some federal
jurisprudence on proof of "highest and best use" of property in
the Nastasi case. 8 Condemnor argued that, since zoning restrictions prevented commercial use of property at the time of taking,
it could not therefore be so valued. The court found no Louisiana authority on the point but was persuaded to adopt the
federal rule to the effect that "if there is a reasonablepossibility
that the zoning classification will be changed, this possibility
should be considered in arriving at the proper value. '39 Adequate
proof that such a possibility existed was deemed to consist in
the fact that a comparable property in the neighborhood had
been successfully rezoned for commercial use. 40 The same court
indicated that, where property was sought to be valued on the
35. Id. at 448-49.
36. Under IA. R.S. 48:451 (1950), any defendant may apply for a trial to
determine the just and adequate compensation to which he is entitled, provided he
files an answer within one year from the date he is notified in writing of the
final acceptance of the project by the Department offHighways. Under La. R.S.
48:453, damages will then be determined as of the time of trial. See Darsey,
Expropriation by Ex Part Order, 26 LA. L. REV. 91, 102-03 (1965) for experience under these provisions.
37. Here, no delay was sought in the determination of damages; the sale of
dirt occurred after suit was filed but prior to time of trial.
38. City of Monroe v. Nastasi, 175 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965), writs
refused, 176 So. 2d 450, 248 La. 117 (1965).
39. 175 So. 2d at 683, citing United States v. Meadowbrook Club, 259 F.2d 41
(2d Cir. 1958).
40. Ibid. See also City of Monroe v. Corso, 179 So. 2d 696 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1965) ; Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 291, 313 (1966).
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assumption that the property could be sold as a unit for a
single integrated business operation, there must be a showing
of reasonable prospects for such use; the fact that it was suitable
for such use, and testimony that the "general area will have a
transition of use to a much higher type use during the coming
few years," was not a foundation for such higher type use at
41
the time of taking.
One of the complexities of valuing potential subdivision property has been the proper allowance for time lag in the sale of
individual lots; this factor was given consideration recently by
the Third Circuit in noting approvingly that, where there is no
present market for individual lots, such property must be "valued as a whole, as if sold to a developer for resale who would...
make proper allowance for interest on his investment while
waiting for sales, expected profits, development costs, sales
commissions." However, the court was persuaded that in the
case before it, where there was a present market for tracts smaller than the whole, where their best use and value were clear,
and where there were "essentially no development costs," a
42
wholesale price was not appropriate.
Louisiana has a statute which declares that, in estimating
value of property expropriated, it shall be done "without deducting therefrom any amount for the benefit derived by the owner
from the contemplated improvement or work." 43 When applied
to the taking of frontage property incident to widening an existing highway, where the property taken is part of a larger tract
which will have the same frontage on the newlywidened rightof-way, the paradoxical result is reached that the condemnor
must pay for taking away a benefit which it immediately reconfers but may nonetheless take no credit therefor against the
award. 44 On the other hand, if severance damages are claimed
41. State v. Maggio, 178 So. 2d 802, 804 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965). See also
Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Bowie Lumber Co., 176 So. 2d 735, 741
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1965) : "The mere fact that this property possesses attributes
found desirable or actually required for industrial use does not ipso facto render
. . . property in its highest and best use industrially."

42. Lake Charles Harbor & Term. Dist. v. Prestridge, 182 So. 2d 334, 337-38
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).

43. LA. R.S. 19:9 (1950).
44. State v. LeDoux, 184 So. 2d 604 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966); State v. Bertrand, 184 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966). The court deems the rule settled
by the refusal of writs in State v. Landry, 171 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1965) and the statement by the Supreme Court that "on the facts found by the
court of appeal there appears no error of law in its judgment." 247 La. 676, 173
So.2d 541 (1965).
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in connection with such a taking, special benefits conferred on
the remainder by the improvement may be offset. 45 Thus, the
overall compensation could differ as to similar tracts of land
depending on the way in which the claim is made. The condemnor sought to temper the results in LeDoux by estimating
the award as a pro rata portion of the entire tract valued on an
46
average basis, but the Third Circuit rejected the approach.
47
This term brought to the First Circuit the Cockerham case,
involving valuation of the interest of a property owner and his
two lessees, a case significant because of the use of the "gallonage" approach in determining the value of a service station
lessee's interest.
The trial court accepted expert testimony that the total property was properly valued at $167,507, such value being established by comparable sales data for the land and engineering
valuation of improvements on the basis of reproduction cost new
less estimated depreciation. 48 The trial court accepted, as the
value of the landowner's interest, the value of the land plus the
capitalized value of the contract rents exceeding six per cent on
such land value, or a total value for the landowner's interest of
$147,960. The court accepted a valuation for first lessee's
interest of some $16,000, arrived at by discounting the excess of
economic rent over contract rent to present value on the basis
of compound discount at six per cent per annum;49 the trial
court assigned the balance of the value for the total property,
or $3500, as the value of the second lessee's interest.
Condemnor's appraisers estimated no lease advantage for
the second lessee, but the lessee's appraisers estimated such value
at from $50,000 to $71,000. Potential economic rent was calculated as what a purchaser of the lease would pay based on the
gallonage currently pumped at the station, such estimated
monthly rent ranging up to $1050.00 per month, or some $450.00
per month in excess of contract. 50 Apparently, the trial court
rejected this valuation as too speculative.
45. Louisiana Highway Comm. v. Grey, 197 La. 942, 2 So. 2d 654 (1941),
followed in Parish of E.B.R. v. Edwards, 119 So. 2d 175, 178 (La. App. 1st Cir.
19CO).
46. 184 So. 2d at 609.
47. State v. Cockerham, 182 So, 2d 786 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966), writ refused
249 La. 110, 185 So. 2d 219 (1966).
48. 182 So. 2d at 797.
49. Id. at 787 and 797.
50. Id. at 801.

478
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On appeal, second lessee persuaded the First Circuit that the
lease advantage was not properly valued at $3500. Second lessee's
expert had testified that the maximum monthly rental of
$1050.00 could be supported on the basis of the gallonage
pumped, assuming certain improvements were added, and had
discounted this excess over lease rent to present value using an
eight per cent discount factor, presumably using eight percent
because of the speculative character of the estimate. A substantial expense factor was also allowed by the expert in connection
with such increased rentals and the present value of the improvements to be made during the lease deducted. Thus the expert arrived at a $50,000 valuation."1 The First Circuit accepted
$450.00 per month as the lease advantage but was persuaded
that such advantage was so non-speculative as to warrant discount at six per cent rather than the eight per cent used by
the expert; that no expense allowance would be necessary; and
that the higher rent could be realized without the stipulated
improvements. On these favorable assumptions, the First Circuit calculated that the lease advantage was not $3500.00 as the
trial court had found, nor $50,000 as the lessee's expert had
estimated, but almost $70,000.52

The Supreme Court refused

writs, two members of the court dissenting.53
In Thieler,5 4 the Fourth Circuit rejected a claim for moving
expenses, in this case by the owner, noting that, "in expropriation proceedings mere consequential damages arising from disturbance or injury to business is damnum absque injuria."55
What could be an important procedural point in suits brought
to recover damages after a taking was decided in landowner's
favor at this term by the Fourth Circuit.5 An earlier expropriation suit resulted in an award and final judgment for land taken,
reserving to landowner his right "by proper proceeding" to assert any further claim for damages. Some three years later, a
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid. The First Circuit cited State v. Levy, 242 La. 259, 136 So. 2d 35
(1962), where however the Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Second
Circuit holding that, although there was no evidence that expropriated premises
could be rented for more than the contract rent, there was nonetheless value for
the lease on the bald assumption that the premises should be rented for a 12 per
cent return and that the resulting excess over contract rent represented lease
advantage without discounting present value. State v. Levy, 129 So. 2d 516 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1961). See also State v. Ferris, 227 La. 13, 78 So. 2d 493 (1955).
53. 249 La. 110, 185 So. 2d 219 (1966).
54. City of New Orleans v. Thieler, 181 So. 2d 56 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
55. Id. at 59.
56. Petrovich v. State, 181 So. 2d 811 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
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petition for damages was filed in the proceeding and was met
with an exception to the court's jurisdiction, which was maintained because of the previous final judgment. The petition, it
was argued, was a new suit for damages to which the state had
not consented. A second suit was also dismissed. On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit rejected the plea to the jurisdiction, holding
failure to caption a pleading "supplemental" should not be fatal
to the court's jurisdiction to hear a later claim for damages resulting from an expropriation;57 the constitutional provision
against taking or damaging "has long been held to permit recovery against the state, without the necessity of the state's consenting to suit, for damages resulting to property beyond that
actually expropriated." However, having found jurisdiction, it
sustained other exceptions and remanded the cases to permit
amendment of the pleadings; a cause of action for damages, if
it could be stated, would lie only against the United States under
the federal-state agreement which provides only for indemnification from the state in the event of successful suits against the
United States. 58

TORTS
Leah S. Guerry*
From the many tort cases decided by the Louisiana appellate
courts during the past term, the writer has selected for discussion a few which represent new interpretations of the law or
applications of recent tort theory, or which present an occasion
for discussing new trends in other jurisdictions.
Defamation of a Public Official
In March 1964 the United States Supreme Court decided the
case of New York Times v. Sullivan,1 holding that the first
amendment to the United States Constitution "prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves the statement
was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that
57. Id. at 813.
58. Id. at 814.
*Research Assistant, Louisiana State University School of Law.
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

